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Abstract
Intuitively, obedience – following the order that a
human gives – seems like a good property for a
robot to have. But, we humans are not perfect
and we may give orders that are not best aligned
to our preferences. We show that when a human
is not perfectly rational then a robot that tries to
infer and act according to the human’s underlying
preferences can always perform better than a robot
that simply follows the human’s literal order. Thus,
there is a tradeoff between the obedience of a robot
and the value it can attain for its owner. We inves-
tigate how this tradeoff is impacted by the way the
robot infers the human’s preferences, showing that
some methods err more on the side of obedience
than others. We then analyze how performance de-
grades when the robot has a misspecified model of
the features that the human cares about or the level
of rationality of the human. Finally, we study how
robots can start detecting such model misspecifi-
cation. Overall, our work suggests that there might
be a middle ground in which robots intelligently de-
cide when to obey human orders, but err on the side
of obedience.
1 Introduction
Should robots be obedient? The reflexive answer to this ques-
tion is yes. A coffee making robot that doesn’t listen to your
coffee order is not likely to sell well. Highly capable au-
tonomous system that don’t obey human commands run sub-
stantially higher risks, ranging from property damage to loss
of life (Asaro, 2006; Lewis, 2014) to potentially catastrophic
threats to humanity (Bostrom, 2014; Russell et al., 2015). In-
deed, there are several recent examples of research that con-
siders the problem of building agents that at the very least
obey shutdown commands (Soares et al., 2015; Orseau and
Armstrong, 2016; Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017).
However, in the long-term making systems blindly obedi-
ent doesn’t seem right either. A self-driving car should cer-
tainly defer to its owner when she tries taking over because
it’s driving too fast in the snow. But on the other hand, the car
shouldn’t let a child accidentally turn on the manual driving
mode.
Figure 1: (Left) The blindly obedient robot always follows
H’s order. (Right) An IRL-R computes an estimate of H’s
preferences and picks the action optimal for this estimate.
The suggestion that it might sometimes be better for an
autonomous systems to be disobedient is not new (Weld and
Etzioni, 1994; Scheutz and Crowell, 2007). For example, this
is the idea behind “Do What I Mean” systems (Teitelman,
1970) that attempt to act based on the user’s intent rather than
the user’s literal order.
A key contribution of this paper is to formalize this idea,
so that we can study properties of obedience in AI systems.
Specifically, we focus on investigating how the tradeoff be-
tween the robot’s level of obedience and the value it attains
for its owner is affected by the rationality of the human, the
way the robot learns about the human’s preferences over time,
and the accuracy of the robot’s model of the human. We ar-
gue that these properties are likely to have a predictable effect
on the robot’s obedience and the value it attains.
We start with a model of the interaction between a human
H and robot1 R that enables us to formalizeR’s level of obe-
dience (Section 2). H and R are cooperative, but H knows
the reward parameters θ and R does not. H can order R to
take an action and R can decide whether to obey or not. We
show that if R tries to infer θ from H’s orders and then acts
1We use “robot” to refer to any autonomous system.
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by optimizing its estimate of θ, then it can always do better
than a blindly obedient robot whenH is not perfectly rational
(Section 3). Thus, forcing R to be blindly obedient does not
come for free: it requires giving up the potential to surpass
human performance.
We cast the problem of estimating θ from H’s orders as
an inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) problem (Ng et al.,
2000; Abbeel and Ng, 2004). We analyze the obedience and
value attained by robots with different estimates for θ (Sec-
tion 4). In particular, we show that a robot that uses a maxi-
mum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ is more obedient toH’s
first order than any other robot.
Finally, we examine how R’s value and obedience is im-
pacted when it has a misspecified model of H’s policy or θ
(Section 5). We find that whenR uses the MLE it is robust to
misspecification of H’s rationality level (i.e. takes the same
actions that it would have with the true model), although with
the optimal policy it is not. This suggests that we may want to
use policies that are alternative to the “optimal” one because
they are more robust to model misspecification.
IfR is missing features of θ, then it is less obedient than it
should be, whereas with extra, irrelevant features R is more
obedient. This suggests that to ensure that R errs on the side
of obedience we should equip it with a more complex model.
When R has extra features, then it still attains more value
than a blindly obedient robot. But if R is missing features,
then it is possible for R to be better off being obedient. We
use the fact that with the MLE R should nearly always obey
H’s first order (as proved in Section 4) to enable R to detect
when it is missing features and act accordingly obedient.
Overall, we conclude that in the long-term we should aim
for R to intelligently decide when to obey H or not, since
with a perfect model R can always do better than being
blindly obedient. But our analysis also shows that R’s value
and obedience can easily be impacted by model misspecifi-
cation. So in the meantime, it is critical to ensure that our
approximations err on the side of obedience and are robust to
model misspecification.
2 Human-Robot Interaction Model
Suppose H is supervising R in a task. At each step H can
orderR to take an action, butR chooses whether to listen or
not. We wish to analyzeR’s incentive to obeyH given that
1. H andR are cooperative (have a shared reward)
2. H knows the reward parameters, butR does not
3. R can learn about the reward throughH’s orders
4. H may act suboptimally
We first contribute a general model for this type of inter-
action, which we call a supervision POMDP. Then we add a
simplifying assumption that makes this model clearer to an-
alyze while still maintaining the above properties, and focus
on this simplified version for the rest of the paper.
Supervision POMDP. At each step in a supervision POMDP
H first orders R to take a particular action and then R ex-
ecutes an action it chooses. The POMDP is described by a
tuple M = 〈S,Θ,A, R, T, P0, γ〉. S is a set of world states.
Θ is a set of static reward parameters. The hidden state space
of the POMDP is S × Θ and at each step R observes the
current world state and H’s order. A is R’s set of actions.
R : S × A × Θ → R is a parametrized, bounded function
that maps a world state, the robot’s action, and the reward pa-
rameters to the reward. T : S × A × S → [0, 1] returns the
probability of transitioning to a state given the previous state
and the robot’s action. P0 : S × Θ → [0, 1] is a distribution
over the initial world state and reward parameters. γ ∈ [0, 1)
is the discount factor.
We assume that there is a (bounded) featurization of state-
action pairs φ : S × A → R and the reward function is a
linear combination of the reward parameters θ ∈ Θ and these
features: R(s, a) = θTφ(s, a). For clarity, we writeA asAH
when we mean H’s orders and as AR when we mean R’s
actions. H’s policy piH is Markovian: piH : S ×Θ×AH →
[0, 1]. R’s policy can depend on the history of previous states,
orders, and actions: piR : [S×AH×AR]∗×S×AH → AR.
Human and Robot. Let Q(s, a; θ) be the Q-value function
under the optimal policy for the reward function parametrized
by θ.
A rational human gives the optimal order, i.e. follows the
policy
pi∗H(s, a; θ) =
{
1 if a = argmaxaQ(s, a; θ)
0 o.w.
A noisily rational human follows the policy
p˜iH(s, a; θ, β) ∝ exp (Q(s, a; θ)/β) (1)
β is the rationality parameter. As β → 0, H becomes ratio-
nal (p˜iH → pi∗H). And as β → ∞, H becomes completely
random (p˜iH → Unif(A)).
Let h = 〈(s1, o1), . . . , (sn, on)〉 be this history of past
states and orders where (sn, on) is the current state and or-
der. A blindly obedient robot’s policy is to always follow
the human’s order:
piOR(h) = on
An IRL robot, IRL-R, is one whose policy is to maximize
an estimate, θˆn(h), of θ:
piR(h) = argmax
a
Q(sn, a; θˆn(h)) (2)
Simplification to Repeated Game. For the rest of the paper
unless otherwise noted we focus on a simpler repeated game
in which each state is independent of the next, i.e T (s, a, s′)
is independent of s and a. The repeated game eliminates any
exploration-exploitation tradeoff: Q(s, a; θˆn) = θˆTnφ(s, a).
But it still maintains the properties listed at the beginning of
this section, allowing us to more clearly analyze their effects.
3 Justifying Autonomy
In this section we show that there exists a tradeoff between
the performance of a robot and its obedience. This provides
a justification for why one might want a robot that isn’t obe-
dient: robots that are sometimes disobedient perform better
than robots that are blindly obedient.
We defineR’s obedience,O, as the probability thatR fol-
lowsH’s order:
On = P (piR(h) = on)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100Au
to
no
m
y A
dv
an
tag
e (
∆)
# Steps
max ∆
(a)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Ob
ed
ien
ce
 (O
)
# Steps
P(optimal order)
(b)
Figure 2: Autonomy advantage ∆ (left) and obedience O (right) over time.
To study how much of an advantage (or disadvantage) H
gains fromR, we define the autonomy advantage, ∆, as the
expected extra rewardR receives over followingH’s order:
∆n = E[R(sn, piR(h))−R(sn, on)]
We will drop the subscript on On and ∆n when talking
about properties that hold ∀n. We will also use Rn(pi) to de-
note the reward of policy pi at step n, and φn(a) = φ(sn, a).
Remark 1. For the robot to gain any advantage from being
autonomous, it must sometimes be disobedient: ∆ > 0 =⇒
O < 1.
This is because whenever R is obedient ∆ = 0. This cap-
tures the fact that a blindly obedient R is limited by H’s de-
cision making ability. However, if R follows a type of IRL
policy, thenR is guaranteed a positive advantage whenH is
not rational. The next theorem states this formally.
Theorem 1. The optimal robotR∗ is an IRL-R whose policy
pi∗R has θˆ equal to the posterior mean of θ. R
∗ is guaranteed
a nonnegative advantage on each round: ∀n ∆n ≥ 0 with
equality if and only if ∀n pi∗R = piOR.
Proof. When each step is independent of the next R’s opti-
mal policy is to pick the action that is optimal for the current
step (Kaelbling et al., 1996). This results in R picking the
action that is optimal for the posterior mean,
pi∗R(h) = max
a
E[φn(a)T θ|h] = max
a
φn(a)
TE[θ|h]
By definition E[Rn(pi∗R)] ≥ E[Rn(piOR)]. Thus, ∀n ∆n =
E[Rn(pi∗R) − Rn(piOR)] ≥ 0. Also, by definition, ∀n ∆n =
0 ⇐⇒ pi∗R = piOR.
In addition to R∗ being an IRL-R, the following IRL-Rs
also converge to the maximum possible autonomy advantage.
Theorem 2. Let ∆¯n = E[Rn(pi∗H) − Rn(piH)] be the maxi-
mum possible autonomy advantage and On = P (Rn(pi∗H) =
Rn(piH)) be the probability H’s order is optimal. Assume
that when there are multiple optimal actions R picks H’s
order if it is optimal. If piR is an IRL-R policy (Equation
2) and θˆn is strongly consistent, i.e P (θˆn = θ) → 1, then
∆n − ∆¯n → 0 and On −On → 0.
Proof.
∆n − ∆¯n = E[Rn(piR)−Rn(pi∗H)|θˆn = θ]P (θˆn = θ)
+ E[Rn(piR)−Rn(pi∗H)|θˆn 6= θ]P (θˆn 6= θ)→ 0
because E[Rn(piR)−Rn(pi∗H)|θˆn 6= θ] is bounded. Similarly,
On −On = P (piR(h) = piH(sn))− P (Rn(pi∗H) = Rn(piH))
= P (piR(h) = piH(sn)|θˆn = θ)P (θˆn = θ)
+ P (piR(h) = piH(sn)|θˆn 6= θ)P (θˆn 6= θ)
− P (Rn(pi∗H) = Rn(piH))
→ P (Rn(pi∗H) = Rn(piH))− P (Rn(pi∗H) = Rn(piH)) = 0
Remark 2. In the limit ∆n is higher for less optimal humans
(humans with a lower expected reward E[R(sn, on)]).
Theorem 3. The optimal robotR∗ is blindly obedient if and
only ifH is rational: pi∗R = pi
O
R ⇐⇒ piH = pi∗H
Proof. Let O(h) = {θ ∈ Θ : oi = argmaxaRi(a), i =
1, . . . , n} be the subset of Θ for which o1, . . . , on are opti-
mal. If H is rational, then R’s posterior only has support
over O(h). So,
E[Rn(a)|h] =
∫
θ∈O(h)
θTφn(a)P (θ|h)dθ
≤
∫
θ∈O(h)
θTφn(on)P (θ|h)dθ = E[Rn(on)|h]
Thus,H is rational =⇒ pi∗R = piOR.
R∗ is an IRL-Rwhere θˆn is the posterior mean. If the prior
puts non-zero mass on the true θ, then the posterior mean is
consistent (Diaconis and Freedman, 1986). Thus by Theorem
2, ∆n − ∆¯n → 0. Therefore if ∀n ∆n = 0, then ∆¯n → 0,
which implies that P (piH = pi∗H) → 1. When piH is station-
ary this means thatH is rational. Thus, pi∗R = pi
O
R =⇒ H is
rational.
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Figure 3: WhenH is more irrational ∆ converges to a higher
value, but at a slower rate.
We have shown that making R blindly obedient does not
come for free. A positive ∆ requires being sometimes disobe-
dient (Remark 1). Under the optimal policy R is guaranteed
a positive ∆ whenH is not rational. And in the limit,R con-
verges to the maximum possible advantage. Furthermore, the
more suboptimalH is, the more of an advantageR eventually
earns (Remark 2). Thus, makingR blindly obedient requires
giving up on this potential ∆ > 0.
However, as Theorem 2 points out, as n → ∞ R also
only listens to H’s order when it is optimal. Thus, ∆ and
O come at a tradeoff. Autonomy advantage requires giving
up obedience, and obedience requires giving up autonomy
advantage.
4 Approximations via IRL
R∗ is an IRL-R with θˆ equal to the posterior mean, i.e.
R∗ performs Bayesian IRL (Ramachandran and Amir, 2007).
However, as others have noted Bayesian IRL can be very ex-
pensive in complex environments (Michini and How, 2012).
We could instead approximate R∗ by using a less expensive
IRL algorithm. Furthermore, by Theorem 2 we can guarantee
convergence to optimal behavior.
Simpler choices for θˆ include the maximum-a-posteriori
(MAP) estimate, which has previously been suggested as an
alternative to Bayesian IRL (Choi and Kim, 2011), or the
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). If H is noisily ratio-
nal (Equation 1) and β = 1, then the MLE is equivalent to
Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart et al., 2008).
Although Theorem 2 allows us to justify approximations at
the limit, it is also important to ensure thatR’s early behavior
is not dangerous. Specifically, we may want R to err on the
side of obedience early on. To investigate this we first prove
a necessary property for any IRL-R to followH’s order:
Lemma 1. (Undominated necessary) Call on undominated
if there exists θ ∈ Θ such that on is optimal, i.e on =
argmaxa θ
Tφ(sn, a). It is necessary for on to be undomi-
nated for an IRL-R to execute on.
Proof. R executes a = argmaxa θˆ
T
nφ(sn, a), so it is not pos-
sible for R to execute on if there is no choice of θˆn that
makes on optimal. This can happen when one action dom-
inates another action in value. For example, suppose Θ = R2
and there are three actions with features φ(s, a1) = [−1,−1],
φ(s, a2) = [0, 0], φ(s, a3) = [1, 1]. If H picks a2, then there
is no θ ∈ Θ that makes a2 optimal, and thus R will never
follow a2.
One basic property we may wantR to have is for it to listen
to H early on. The next theorem looks at we can guarantee
about R’s obedience to the first order when H is noisily ra-
tional.
Theorem 4. (Obedience to noisily rationalH on 1st order)
(a) When Θ = Rd the MLE does not exist after one order.
But if we constrain the norm of θˆ to not be too large,
then we can ensure that R follows an undominated o1.
In particular, ∃K such that whenR plans using the MLE
θˆ ∈ Θ′ = {θ ∈ Θ : ||θ||2 ≤ K} R executes o1 if and
only if o1 is undominated.
(b) If any IRL robot follows o1, so does MLE-R. In partic-
ular, ifR∗ follows o1, so does MLE-R.
(c) If R uses the MAP or posterior mean, it is not guaran-
teed to follow an undominated o1. Furthermore, even if
R∗ follows o1, MAP-R is not guaranteed to follow o1.
Proof. (a) The only if condition holds from Lemma 1. Sup-
pose o1 is undominated. Then there exists θ∗ such that
o1 is optimal for θ∗. o1 is still optimal for a scaled ver-
sion, cθ∗. As c → ∞, p˜iH(o1; cθ∗) → 1, but never
reaches it. Thus, the MLE does not exist.
However since p˜iH(o1; cθ∗) monotonically increases to-
wards 1, ∃C such that for c > C, p˜iH(o; cθ∗) > 0.5.
If K > C||θ∗||, then the MLE will be optimal for
o1 because p˜iH(o1; θˆ1) ≥ 0.5 and R executes a =
argmaxa θˆ
Tφ(a) = argmaxa p˜iH(a; θˆ). Therefore, in
practice we can simply use the MLE while constraining
||θ||2 to be less than some very large number.
(b) From Lemma 1 if any IRL-R follows o1, then o1 is un-
dominated. Then by (a) MLE-R follows o1.
(c) For space we omit explicit counterexamples, but both
statements hold because we can construct adversarial
priors for which o1 is suboptimal for the posterior mean
and for which o1 is optimal for the posterior mean, but
not for the MAP.
Theorem 4 suggests that at least at the beginning when R
uses the MLE it errs on the side of giving us the “benefit of
the doubt”, which is exactly what we would want out of an
approximation.
Figure 2a and 2b plot ∆ and O for an IRL robot that uses
the MLE. As expected, R gains more reward than a blindly
obedient one (∆ > 0), eventually converging to the maxi-
mum autonomy advantage (Figure 2a). On the other hand, as
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Figure 4: ∆ and O when Θ is misspecified
R learns about θ, its obedience also decreases, until eventu-
ally it only listens to the human when she gives the optimal
order (Figure 2b).
As pointed out in Remark 2, ∆ is eventually higher for
more irrational humans. However, a more irrational human
also provides noisier evidence of θ, so the rate of conver-
gence of ∆ is also slower. So, although initially ∆ may be
lower for a more irrational H, in the long run there is more
to gain from being autonomous when interacting with a more
irrational human. Figure 3 shows this empirically.
All experiments in this paper use the following parame-
ters unless otherwise noted. At the start of each episode
θ ∼ N (0, I) and at each step φn(a) ∼ N (0, I). There are 10
actions, 10 features, and β = 2. 2
Finally, even with good approximations we may still have
good reason for feeling hesitation about disobedient robots.
The naive analysis presented so far assumes that R’s mod-
els are perfect, but it is almost certain that R’s models of
complex things like human preferences and behavior will be
incorrect. By Theorem 1,R will not obey even the first order
made byH if there is no θ ∈ Θ that makesH’s order optimal.
So clearly, it is possible to have disastrous effects by having
an incorrect model of Θ. In the next section we look at how
misspecification of possible human preferences (Θ) and hu-
man behavior (piH) can cause the robot to be overconfident
and in turn less obedient than it should be. The autonomy
advantage can easily become the rebellion regret.
5 Model Misspecification
Incorrect Model of Human Behavior. Having an incorrect
model of H’s rationality (β) does not change the actions of
MLE-R, but does change the actions ofR∗.
Theorem 5. (Incorrect model of human policy) Let β0 be
H’s true rationality and β′ be the rationality that R believes
H has. Let θˆ and θˆ′ beR’s estimate under the true model and
misspecified model, respectively. Call R robust if its actions
under β′ are the same as its actions under β0.
(a) MLE-R is robust.
2All experiments can be replicated using the Jupyter notebook
available at http://github.com/smilli/obedience
(b) R∗ is not robust.
Proof. (a) The log likelihood l(h|θ) is concave in η = θ/β.
So, θˆ′n = (β
′/β0)θˆn. This does not change R’s action:
argmaxa θˆ
′T
n φn(a) = argmaxa θˆ
T
nφn(a)
(b) Counterexamples can be constructed based on the fact
that as β → 0, H becomes rational, but as β → ∞, H
becomes completely random. Thus, the likelihood will
“win” over the prior for β → 0, but not when β →∞.
MLE-R is more robust than the optimalR∗. This suggests
a reason beyond computational savings for using approxima-
tions: the approximations may be more robust to misspecifi-
cation than the optimal policy.
Remark 3. Theorem 5 may give us insight into why Maxi-
mum Entropy IRL (which is the MLE with β = 1) works well
in practice. In simple environments where noisy rationality
can be used as a model of human behavior, getting the level
of noisiness right doesn’t matter.
Incorrect Model of Human Preferences. The simplest way
that H’s preferences may be misspecified is through the fea-
turization of θ. Suppose θ ∈ Θ = Rd. R believes that
Θ = Rd′ . R may be missing features (d′ < d) or may have
irrelevant features (d′ > d). R observes a d′ dimensional fea-
ture vector for each action: φn(a) ∼ N(0, Id′×d′). The true θ
depends on only the first d features, butR estimates θ ∈ Rd′ .
Figure 4 shows how ∆ and O change over time as a function
of the number of features for a MLE-R. When R has irrele-
vant features it still achieves a positive ∆ (and still converges
to the maximum ∆ because θˆ remains consistent over a su-
perset of Θ). But if R is missing features, then ∆ may be
negative, and thusR would be better off being blindly obedi-
ent instead. Furthermore, whenR contains extra features it is
more obedient than it would be with the true model. But ifR
is missing features, then it is less obedient than it should be.
This suggests that to ensure R errs on the side of obedience
we should err on the side of givingR a more complex model.
Detecting Misspecification. IfR has the wrong model of Θ,
R may be better off being obedient. In the remainder of this
section we look at howR can detect that it is missing features
and act accordingly obedient.
Figure 5: (Detecting misspecification) The bold line shows
the R that tries detecting missing features (Equation 3), as
compared to MLE-R (which is also shown in Figure 4).
Remark 4. (Policy mixing) We can make R more obedient,
while maintaining convergence to the maximum advantage,
by mixingR’s policy piIR with a blindly obedient policy:
piR(h) = 1{δn = 0}piOR(h) + 1{δn = 1}piIR(h)
P (δn = i) =
{
cn i = 0
1− cn i = 1
where 1 ≥ cn ≥ 0 with cn → 0. In particular, we can have
an initial “burn-in” period whereR is blindly obedient for a
finite number of rounds before switching to piIR.
By Theorem 4 we know MLE-Rwill always obeyH’s first
order if it is undominated. This means that for MLE-R, O1
should be close to one if undominated orders are expected to
be rare. As pointed out in Remark 4 we can have an initial
“burn-in” period where R always obeys H. Let R have a
burn-in obedience period of B rounds. R uses this burn-in
period to calculate the sample obedience on the first order:
O˜1 = 1
B
B∑
i=1
1{argmax
a
θˆ1(hi)
Tφi(a) = oi}
If O˜1 is not close to one, then it is likely that R has the
wrong model of Θ, and would be better off just being obedi-
ent. So, we can choose some small  and makeR’s policy
piR(h) =

on n ≤ B
on n > B, O˜1 < 1− 
argmaxa θˆ
T
nφn(a) n > B, O˜1 > 1− 
(3)
Figure 5 shows the ∆ of this robot as compared to the
MLE-R from Figure 4 after using the first ten orders as a
burn-in period. ThisR achieves higher ∆ than MLE-R when
missing features and still does as well as MLE-Rwhen it isn’t
missing features.
Note that this strategy relies on the fact that MLE-R has
the property of always following an undominated first order.
IfR were using the optimal policy, it is unclear what kind of
simple property we could use to detect missing features. This
gives us another reason for using an approximation: we may
be able to leverage its properties to detect misspecification.
6 Related Work
Ensuring Obedience. There are several recent examples of
research that aim to provably ensure that H can interrupt R.
(Soares et al., 2015; Orseau and Armstrong, 2016; Hadfield-
Menell et al., 2017). Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) show that
R’s obedience depends on a tradeoff betweenR’s uncertainty
about θ and H’s rationality. However, they considered R’s
uncertainty in the abstract. In practiceR would need to learn
about θ through H’s behavior. Our work analyzes how the
wayR learns about θ impacts its performance and obedience.
Intent Inference For Assistance. Instead of just being
blindly obedient, an autonomous system can inferH’s inten-
tion and actively assist H in achieving it. Do What I Mean
software packages interpret the intent behind what a program-
mer wrote to automatically correct programming errors (Teit-
elman, 1970). When a user uses a telepointer network lag
can cause jitter in her cursor’s path. Gutwin et al. (2003) ad-
dress this by displaying a prediction of the user’s desired path,
rather than the actual cursor path.
Similarly, in assistive teleoperation, the robot does not di-
rectly execute H’s (potentially noisy) input. It instead acts
based on an inference ofH’s intent. In Dragan and Srinivasa
(2012) R acts according to an arbitration between H’s pol-
icy andR’s prediction ofH’s policy. Like our work, Javdani
et al. (2015) formalize assistive teleoperation as a POMDP
in which H’s goals are unknown, and try to optimize an in-
ference of H’s goal. While assistive teleoperation apriori
assumes that R should act assistively, we show that under
model misspecification sometimes it is better forR to simply
defer toH, and contribute a method to decide between active
assistance and blind obedience (Remark 4).
Inverse Reinforcement Learning. We use inverse reinforce-
ment learning (Ng et al., 2000; Abbeel and Ng, 2004) to infer
θ fromH’s orders. We analyze how different IRL algorithms
affect autonomy advantage and obedience, properties not pre-
viously studied in the literature. In addition, we analyze how
model misspecification of the features of the space of reward
parameters or the H’s rationality impacts autonomy advan-
tage and obedience.
IRL algorithms typically assume thatH is rational or nois-
ily rational. We show that Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart
et al., 2008) is robust to misspecification of a noisily ratio-
nal H’s rationality (β). However, humans are not truly nois-
ily rational, and in the future it is important to investigate
other models of humans in IRL and their potential misspec-
ifications. Evans et al. (2016) takes a step in this direction
and modelsH as temporally inconsistent and potentially hav-
ing false beliefs. In addition, IRL assumes that H acts with-
out awareness ofR’s presence, cooperative inverse reinforce-
ment learning (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016) relaxes this as-
sumption by modeling the interaction betweenH andR as a
two-player cooperative game.
7 Conclusion
To summarize our key takeaways:
1. (∆ > 0) If H is not rational, then R can always attain
a positive ∆. Thus, forcing R to be blindly obedient
requires giving up on a positive ∆.
2. (∆ vs O) There exists a tradeoff between ∆ and O. At
the limitR∗ attains the maximum ∆, but only obeysH’s
order when it is the optimal action.
3. (MLE-R) WhenH is noisily rational MLE-R is at least
as obedient as any other IRL-R to H’s first order. This
suggests that the MLE is a good approximation to R∗
because it errs on the side of obedience.
4. (Wrong β) MLE-R is robust to having the wrong model
of the human’s rationality (β), but R∗ is not. This sug-
gests that we may not want to use the “optimal” policy
because it may not be very robust to misspecification.
5. (Wrong Θ) If R has extra features, it is more obedient
than with the true model, whereas if it is missing fea-
tures, then it is less obedient. If R has extra features, it
will still converge to the maximum ∆. But ifR is miss-
ing features, it is sometimes better forR to be obedient.
This implies that erring on the side of extra features is
far better than erring on the side of fewer features.
6. (Detecting wrong Θ) We can detect missing features by
checking how likely MLE-R is to follow the first order.
Overall, our analysis suggests that in the long-term we
should aim to create robots that intelligently decide when to
follow orders, but in the meantime it is crucial to ensure that
these robots err on the side of obedience and are robust to
misspecified models.
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